



The Condorcet paradox: an experimental approach to a voting process 
 






This paper analyses the effects played by rules within a coordination game. The starting point is constituted 
by the wide field of Public Choice theories. More precisely the focus of the research is on the stability of 
the voting process. The experiment is build on a game played through computers and the experimental 
subjects must perform some choices that can led to different individual and collective solutions. The game 
that they play is based on a set of rules that must be voted by the players themselves before a new session 




   2 
1. Introduction 
 
This paper is on the Condorcet paradox. More precisely is an experimental investigation on 
the stability of the voting process. The idea is to test the well known phenomenon of cyclical 
voting that should arise whenever the voters have double peaked preferences. 
The Condorcet paradox is: “a situation described by the Marquis de Condorcet in the late 
18th century, in which collective preferences can be cyclic (i.e. not transitive), even if the 
preferences  of  individual  voters  are  not.  This  appears  paradoxical,  because  it  means  that 
majority wishes can be in conflict with each other. This paradox can be explained away by the 
fact  that  in  that  case  the  majorities  are  made  up  of  different  groups  of  individuals.  The 
paradox is highlighted by the Condorcet method of voting, which will fail to determine a 
winner in such a situation — an alternate technique must then be used”
1. 
A simple way to describe the Condorcet paradox is to use a numerical example like the 
following (Rouncefield, Green, 2003): 
Three players: A, B and C 
Pr(A outscores B) = 5/9 
Pr(B outscores C) = 5/9 
Pr(A outscores C) = 4/9) 
i.e. A is better than B i.e. B is better than C i.e. A in not better than C, which means that the 
results are not transitive. 
An  example  of  a  real  game  that  produces  a  Condorcet  type  situation  is  the  so  called 
Chinese Dice game (Green, 1981) The dice of this game are marked in this way: 
Die A) 6, 6, 2, 2, 2, 2 
Die B) 5, 5, 5, 5, 1, 1 
Die C) 4, 4, 4, 3, 3, 3  
For these:  
Pr(A outscores B) = 5/9 
Pr(B outscores C) = 6/9 
Pr(A outscores C) = 3/9  
Also this game produces results which are not transitive and therefore are cyclical. 
The  most  important  application  of  the  Condorcet  paradox  is  the  study  of  the  voting 
systems.  The  paradox  arises  every  time  the  voters  have  a  preferences  structure  which  is 
individually  transitive  but  collectively  intransitive.  For  example  imagine  three  voters  that   3 
have the following preferences structures over three alternatives a1, a2, a3 (e.g. three different 
quantities of some public good): 
Voter      Preference 
1      a1 f a2 f a3 
2      a2 f a3 f a1 
3      a3 f a1 f a2 
Assuming that the voters give their support to the first and second choice while never vote 
for  the  third  choice,  then  a  winner  cannot  exist  for  this  profile  if all  the  alternatives  are 
individually voted. 
In literature there are many examples of real situations where the Condorcet paradox takes 
place. I shall restrain myself to quote only Kurrlid-Klitgaard (2001) who describes the case of 
the existence of a real cyclical majority in a poll of Danish voters’ preferred prime minister, 
using  pair-wise  comparison  during  the  elections  of  the  Danish  prime  minister  in  1994. 
Kurrlid-Klitgaard (2001) is also useful for a short review of some articles based on empirical 
evidences of the Condorcet paradox. 
Conversely  looking  to  the  experimental  literature  there  are  not  many  examples  of 
experiments done on the voting process. The focus of the experimental researches is mainly 
concerned with the effects produced on the collective choices by different voting systems, 
instead than on the investigation of the role plaid by different preferences structures. Just as 
an example of an experimental study on the role played by different voting rules one could 
see Forsythe (1991) that analyses a three ways elections model. 
The main attention is here concentrated on the central assumption made by the Condorcet 
paradox, i.e. on the effects produced by double peaked preferences on the stability of the 
voting  process.  This  is  a  topic  that  is  very  difficult  to  investigate  using  a  “traditional” 
empirical approach because the only practical way to check the preferences structure is to ask 
to  the  voters  to  declare  spontaneously  their  wishes  towards  a  given  topic.  Obviously  the 
voters  can  have  strategic  reasons  to  make  false  declarations  and  in  any  way  the  real 
behaviours are not observable so there is no way to check the truthfulness of the individual 
declarations. 
A way to overcome these limits is to use the experimental approach,  which allows to 
simulate in an artificial environment a voting process. To simulate a voting process able to 
investigate on the effects produced by the Condorcet paradox requires three main ingredients: 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
1 http://en2.wikipedia.org/wiki/Condorcet's_paradox   4 
a payoffs structure that links the utility of the experimental subjects to the voting choices, an 
artificial structure of preferences coherent with the payoffs-utility configuration and a social 
environment. The experiment here discussed owns all these characteristics. 
 
 
2. The experimental design 
 
The experiment is a repeated game played by five players. Each round is divided in two 
phases: the voting stage and the playing stage. In the voting stage the experimental subjects 
must choose (and vote) a rule that will be used in the game stage. To play the game the 
subjects must rotate one among four geometric figures that shape a pentagon star. In fig. 2.1 is 
reported the form used for the game. 
 




The first geometrical figure is the large pentagon star which includes the five external 
triangles, the second figure is the inscribed pentagon which is made by the five intermediate 
triangles, finally the third figure is the small star made by the five inner triangles. Each figure 
rotates anti-clockwise, independently from the other ones, and with single steps. The single 
step rule means that to move one triangle from its initial position back to the starting setting 
5 
15 
5   5 
requires five moves (steps). For example to take the blue external triangle from the North 
position to the South West one needs three moves. 
Each of the five players occupies a position indicated by a cardinal point. Subject 1 is in 
position North, subject 2 is in position North East, subject 3 is in position South East, subject 
4 is in position South West and finally subject 5 is in position North West. To each player 
corresponds a colored geometrical surface which is the sum of three triangles: the blue area 
for subject 1, the orange area for subject 2, the yellow area for subject 3 (yellow), the red area 
for subject 4 and the green area for subject 5. 
To the colored surfaces correspond the payoffs areas. The players gain a final prize which 
is the sum of the values reported on each triangle. Only three triangles have numbers on them, 
therefore  to  win  something  one  must  rotate  the  figure  which  takes  one  of  the  numbered 
triangles in her/his payoff area. For example if it is the turn of player North West the most 
rational move is to rotate the external star which will attribute to her/him a payoff of 15 
points. 
The general ingredients of the experiment are the following: 
-  five players, four groups of players; 
-  anonymity; 
-  a set of rounds – each round is divided into two phases: phase1 voting the rules; phase2 
move the wheels accordingly with the rule voted by the majority; one rotation per player; 
-  the positions of the players are assigned randomly; 
-  after 3 voting sessions without a majority the experiment stops and the subjects win a 
fixed (small) reward. 
 
The  number  of  players  can  be  obviously  changed  but  a  total  of  25  subjects  for  each 
experimental session build up a reasonable sample. Similarly the anonymity condition is not a 
strict one and can be relaxed. In the experiments here discussed has been maintained to have a 
“cleaner” experimental outcome. When the subjects have no way to identify their partners the 
results are less affected by psychological uncontrolled factors like for example some form of 
sympathy or antagonism between two or more participants. 
The rules that must be voted in the first phase of the experiment are the following: 
(T) - All the wheels can be rotated
2 
(I) - only the Internal wheel can be rotated 
                                                           
2 “T” stands for the Italian “Tutte”, which means all.   6 
(E) - only the External wheel can be rotated 
The rules used for the experiment are intended to build a system of artificial preferences 
that models a Condorcet paradox situation. More precisely the artificial preferences needed 
are the following: 
-  Player North (N)             I f T f E 
-  Players North and South East (NE; SE)     E f I f T 
-  Players North West and South West (NW; SW)   T f E f I 
To  obtain  the  desired  artificial  preference  system  the  rules  must  be  integrated  with  a 
special condition for player North. More precisely to be fair and to be coherent with the 
artificial preferences system the payoffs scheme must take this structure: 
-  each point is converted in Euro Cents 
-  1 cent for player North 
-  9 cents for players North East and South East 
-  3 cents for Players North West and South West 
-  special payoff for player North: if the rule is T s/he will win 22 points if the light blue 
triangle goes to occupy the position South West. 
The artificial preference structure just described holds only for the first move, i.e. in a one-
shot game setting. To explore the dynamical solution of the game – assuming that each player 
moves only once for a total of 5 moves per round –  is useful to write the numerical solution. 
Tab. 2.1 reports the solution of the game (assuming rational players), the second column of 
the  table  shows  the  moves  that  the  players  can  do  while  the  third  column  reports  the 
individual payoff obtained by each player. Looking to tab. 2.1 is immediately clear that from 
a social point of view the most efficient rule is the “all wheels can rotate”. At the same time it 
is also evident that the all wheels rule is the worst for both the North East and the South East 
players that never win when this rule is at work. The obvious consequence is that the East 
players should try to contrast the all wheel rule. 
An even clearer demonstration of the dominance of the all wheels rule is given by the 
dynamic solution of the game. The solution of a session made of five moves (one for each 
player)  is  reported  in  fig.  2.2.  It  is  important  to  underline  that  at  the  beginning  of  the 
experiment the players do not know the voting agenda, i.e. they do not know ex ante if they 
should vote first for rule all, then for rule external and then for the rule internal or for some 
different sequence of the rules. In particular, they do not know what rule will follow the first 
voting session.   7 
 
Tav. 2.1 Rational moves         
Player  Moves  Payoff    Pay Tot 
  NE  SE SO  NO  N  N  NO  SO  NE  SE     per round 
E  E  M  I  M  98  35  65  0  0    198 
E  E  M  I  I  98  35  65  0  0   198 
E  E  I  M  M  98  35  65  0  0   198 
E  E  I  M  I  98  35  65  0  0   198 
E  M  E  I  M  81  55  50  0  0   186 
E  M  E  I  I  81  55  50  0  0   186 
E  I  E  M  M  81  55  50  0  0   186 
E  I  E  M  I  81  55  50  0  0   186 
M  E  E  I  M  91  45  50  0  0   186 
M  E  E  I  I  91  45  50  0  0   186 
M  M  E  I  E  67  45  35  0  0   147 
M  M  I  E  E  77  35  35  0  0   147 
M  I  M  E  E  72  45  30  0  0   147 
M  I  I  E  E  72  45  30  0  0   147 
I  E  E  M  M  91  45  50  0  0   186 
I  E  E  M  I  91  45  50  0  0   186 
I  M  M  E  E  72  45  30  0  0   147 
I  M  I  E  E  72  45  30  0  0   147 
I  I  E  M  E  67  45  35  0  0   147 
Rule All (T) 
I  I  M  E  E  77  35  35  0  0    147 
Average                                 172,8 
                              
Rule External (E)  E  E  E  E  E  65  15  15  15  15    125 
                              
Rule Internal (I)  I  I  I  I  I  105  5  5  5  5    125 
 
The final situation that emerges from the experimental design is not the one described by 
the Condorcet paradox because the cyclical nature of the voting process holds only in a one 
shot setting while in a dynamic strategic perspective the result should be of a steady state with 
the dominant rule always voted by the majority. 
The experiment models a situation where the static preferences are double peaked and 
should take to a cyclical process of voting but the dominant dynamic strategy is stable so we 
expect that a rational output for the game is to lock in the “all wheels” rule.   8 
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3. The results 
 
Two experimental sessions have been run using two separate samples each of them made 
of  20  participants.  The  experimental  subjects  were  students  of  the  faculty  of  economics 
recruited through advertisements. Half of them were male and the other half female. 
The difference between the two experimental sessions is exclusively related to the number 
of rounds, more precisely in the first experiment the participants had to approve one rule 
majority  nine times, while in the second one the number of the voting sessions that must be 
closed with a majority on a rule was eighteen. It is worth remembering that the experiment 
stops when the participants did not reach a majority on a rule after 3 voting sessions, therefore  
9 and 18 are the “potential” number of voting sessions.  In spite of the constraint on the 
number of null voting sessions the experiment didn’t really stop because we were interested in 
collecting  a  complete  data  set.  Of  course,  the  subjects  perceived  only  a  reduced  payoff, 
accordingly with the general regulations of the experiment.  
The subjects interacted through a computer screen, could not communicate and each of 
them was separated from the others with a box. Before the beginning of the experiment each 
participant received the instructions sheet which was also read by a researcher to be sure that 
everybody understood it correctly. Questions on the instructions were asked and answered 
publicly.  
The results from the voting session are reported in table 3.1 while those from the second 
experiment can be found in table 3.2.. Both tab. 3.1 and tab.3.2 show four tables: one for each 
of the 4 groups made by 5 subjects. In the first column of each table are reported the players, 
N identifies the North player, NE the North East player, SE the South East player, SO the 
South West player and NO the North West player. The first row of each table shows the rules 
to be voted, it is worth remembering that T indicates the “all wheel rule”, I is the “internal 
wheel rule” and E is “the external wheel rule”. In the following columns one can see the 
results of the vote: zero means that the rule has not been voted by a given player, while one 
means that the player voted for the rule. The results shown by table 3.1 give a first piece of   10
information on the voting decisions assumed by the participants of the first experiments. In all 
the groups a cyclical path takes place but it is almost always reduced to two alternatives: the 
rules that win the competitions are “the external wheel rule “ and the “all wheels rule”. This 
means that in spite of theoretical expectances, cyclical patterns emerge from the games. More 
precisely, the all wheels rule -which was expected to dominate the competition- has been 
often voted but the external wheel rule has also been voted for almost the same number of 
time (19 times the subjects voted the T rule versus 16 times the E rule). It is worth noticing 
that the internal wheel rule had the same cumulative performance, measured in terms of total 
payoff, than the external rule. The reason why the internal rule has been voted only once 
(group 1, round 2) is because it produced a strong advantage only for one player, i.e. player 
North. 
 
Tab. 3.1 Results from the first experiment 
Group 1                               
  Rules to be voted     
Players  T  I  E  T  I  E  T  I  E  T  I  E  T     
N  0  1  0  0  1  1  0  1  1  0  1  1  0    
NE  0  0  0  1  0  0  0  0  1  1  0  1  0    
SE  1  0  0  1  0  0  1  0  0  1  0  0  1    
SO  1  1  1  1  0  1  1  0  1  1  1  1  1    
NO  1  1  1  1  0  1  1  0  0  1  0  0  1    
accepted  T  I  -  T  -  E  T  -  E  T  -  E  T     
                               
Group 2                               
  Rules to be voted     
Players  T  I  E  T  I  E  T  I  E  T  I  E  T     
N  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1    
NE  1  0  0  0  0  1  0  0  1  0  0  1  0    
SE  1  0  1  0  0  1  0  0  1  0  0  1  0    
SO  0  1  1  1  0  0  1  0  0  1  0  0  1    
NO  1  0  1  1  0  0  1  0  0  1  0  0  1    
accepted  T  -  E  T  -  E  T  -  E  T  -  E  T     
                               
Group 3                               
  Rules to be voted 
Players  T  I  E  T  I  E  T  I  E  T  I  E  T  I  E 
N  1  1  1  1  0  1  1  0  1  1  0  0  1  0  1 
NE  0  1  0  0  1  1  0  0  1  0  0  1  0  0  1 
SE  1  0  1  1  0  1  1  0  1  0  0  1  1  0  1 
SO  1  0  0  1  0  0  1  1  0  1  1  0  1  0  0 
NO  0  0  1  1  0  0  1  0  0  1  0  0  1  0  0 
accepted  T  -  E  T  -  E  T  -  E  T  -  -  T  -  E 






Group 4                               
    Rules to be voted 
Players  T  I  E  T  I  E  T  I  E  T  I  E  T  I  E 
N  1  0  1  0  0  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1 
NE  1  1  1  0  0  1  0  0  1  0  0  1  0  0  1 
SE  1  0  1  0  0  1  0  0  1  0  0  1  0  0  1 
SO  1  0  0  1  0  0  1  0  0  1  1  0  1  0  0 
NO  1  0  0  1  0  0  1  0  0  1  0  0  1  0  0 
accepted  T  -  E  -  -  E  T  -  E  T  -  E  T  -  E 
 
 
A partially different result has been obtained from experiment 2 where group 2, 3 and 4 
show a tendency towards a steady state in the voting mechanism. The first group of subjects 
of  the  second  experiment  shows  not  only  a  cyclical  pattern  of  voting  but  also  an  almost 
complete cycle with the rule I voted by the majority of the participants 4 times out of 18 
voting sessions. As just anticipated this is not the case for groups 2, 3 and 4. Group 2 locked 
in rule T,  as the theory had forecasted, and the subjects belonging to  this group voted a 
different rule only twice. A similar lock in process can also be observed for the first 10 voting 
sessions of group 3, which approved the T rule eight times voting the E rule only twice. 
Interestingly, after round 10, the players almost totally left the T rule starting to vote initially 
the I rule (twice) then locking in the E rule untill the end of the experiment. The group 4 
pattern can be considered as the almost perfect  mirror like image of group 3. The members of 
group 4 locked in the E rule for the first half of the experiments (voting the T rule only twice 
during the first 8 voting sessions) to pass to a steady state in favor of the T rule after round 9.  
It is worth underlining that both group 2 (after the 13
th  voting session) and group 4 (after 
the 29
th  voting session) virtually finish their game because they did not reach the majority 
under  the  3rd  rounds  condition.  This  means  that  they  received  a  reduced  the  payoff 
accordingly with the instructions of the experiment. It is also interesting to notice that the 
steady state lock in rule T reached by group 2 cost a double “virtual” interruption of the game 
after round 13 and 22. 
An even clearer picture of the different voting pattern followed by the 4 groups of the 
experiment 2 is given by figs. 3.1, 3.2, 3.3 and 3.4. The larger are the cycles shown in the 
figures the higher is the cyclicity of the voting behavior. 
 Tab. 3.2 Results from the second experiment 
Group 1                                                                                                         
  Rules to be voted                                                   
Players  T  I  E  T  I  E  T  I  E  T  I  E  T  I  E  T  I  E  T  I  E  T  I  E  T  I  E                                                   
N  1  0  0  1  1  0  1  1  0  1  1  0  1  1  0  0  1  0  0  1  0  1  1  0  0  1  0                                                   
NE  1  0  1  1  1  1  0  0  0  1  1  1  0  1  0  0  1  1  0  0  1  0  0  1  0  0  1                                                   
SE  0  0  0  1  1  1  0  1  1  0  1  1  0  1  1  0  1  1  0  1  1  0  1  1  0  1  1                                                   
SO  1  0  1  1  0  0  1  0  0  1  0  1  1  0  1  1  0  0  1  0  0  1  0  0  1  0  0                                                   
NO  0  1  1  0  1  1  1  0  0  1  0  0  1  1  1  1  0  1  1  0  1  1  0  1  1  0  1                                                   
accepted  T  -  E  T  I  E  T  -  -  T  I  E  T  I  E  -  I  E  -  -  E  T  -  E  -  -  E                                                   
Group 2                                                                                                         
  Rules to be voted 
Players  T  I  E  T  I  E  T  I  E  T  I  E  T  I  E  T  I  E  T  I  E  T  I  E  T  I  E  T  I  E  T  I  E  T  I  E  T  I  E  T  I  E  T  I  E  T  I  E  T  I  E  T 
N  1  1  0  0  1  1  1  1  0  1  1  0  0  1  0  0  1  0  1  1  0  0  1  0  1  0  0  1  0  0  1  0  0  1  0  0  1  0  0  1  0  0  1  0  0  1  0  0  1  1  0  1 
NE  1  1  1  1  0  1  1  0  1  0  1  1  0  1  1  1  1  1  0  1  1  0  1  1  0  1  1  0  1  1  0  1  1  0  1  1  0  1  1  0  1  1  0  1  1  0  1  1  0  0  1  0 
SE  1  0  0  1  0  0  1  0  1  1  0  1  0  0  1  1  0  1  0  0  1  0  0  1  0  0  1  0  0  1  0  0  1  0  0  1  0  0  1  0  0  1  0  0  1  0  0  1  0  0  1  0 
SO  0  1  0  1  1  0  1  0  0  1  0  0  1  0  0  1  0  0  1  0  0  1  0  0  1  0  0  1  0  0  1  0  0  1  0  0  1  0  0  1  0  0  1  0  0  1  0  0  1  0  0  1 
NO  1  0  0  1  0  0  1  0  0  1  0  0  1  0  0  1  0  0  1  0  0  1  0  1  1  0  0  1  0  0  1  0  0  1  0  0  1  0  0  1  0  0  1  0  0  1  0  0  1  0  0  1 
accepted  T  I  -  T  -  -  T  -  -  T  -  -  -  -  -  T  -  -  T  -  -  -  -  E  T  -  -  T  -  -  T  -  -  T  -  -  T  -  -  T  -  -  T  -  -  T  -  -  T  -  -  T 
Group 3                                                                                                         
  Rules to be voted                           
Players  T  I  E  T  I  E  T  I  E  T  I  E  T  I  E  T  I  E  T  I  E  T  I  E  T  I  E  T  I  E  T  I  E  T  I  E  T  I  E                           
N  1  0  0  1  0  0  1  0  0  1  0  0  1  0  0  1  0  0  1  1  0  1  1  0  1  1  1  0  1  1  0  1  1  0  1  1  0  1  1                           
NE  1  0  0  1  1  0  0  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  0  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  0  1  1  0  0  1  0  0  1  0  0  1                           
SE  1  0  0  1  0  1  1  0  0  1  0  0  1  0  0  1  0  1  1  0  1  0  0  1  0  0  1  0  0  1  0  0  1  0  0  1  0  0  1                           
SO  1  0  1  1  0  1  1  0  0  1  0  0  1  0  1  1  0  1  1  0  0  1  0  0  1  1  0  1  0  1  0  0  1  1  0  1  0  0  1                           
NO  0  0  1  0  0  1  0  0  0  0  1  0  0  1  0  0  1  0  0  0  0  1  1  0  1  0  0  1  0  0  1  0  0  1  1  0  1  0  0                           
accepted  T  -  -  T  -  E  T  -  -  T  -  -  T  -  -  T  -  E  T  -  -  T  I  -  T  I  E  -  -  E  -  -  E  -  -  E  -  -  E                           
Group 4                                                                                                         
  Rules to be voted               
Players  T  I  E  T  I  E  T  I  E  T  I  E  T  I  E  T  I  E  T  I  E  T  I  E  T  I  E  T  I  E  T  I  E  T  I  E  T  I  E  T  I  E  T  I  E               
N  0  0  1  0  0  1  0  0  1  0  0  1  0  0  1  0  0  1  1  0  0  1  0  0  1  1  0  0  0  0  1  0  1  0  0  1  1  0  0  1  0  0  1  0  1               
NE  1  0  1  0  0  1  1  0  1  0  0  1  0  0  1  0  0  1  0  0  1  0  0  1  0  0  1  0  0  1  1  0  1  0  0  1  0  0  1  0  0  1  0  1  1               
SE  1  1  0  0  1  1  0  1  1  0  0  1  0  0  1  0  0  1  0  1  1  0  1  1  0  0  1  0  1  1  0  1  1  0  1  1  0  1  1  0  1  1  0  1  1               
SO  1  0  0  1  0  0  1  0  0  1  1  1  1  0  0  1  1  1  1  0  0  1  0  0  1  0  0  1  0  0  1  0  0  1  0  0  1  0  0  1  0  0  1  0  0               
NO  1  0  1  1  1  0  1  0  0  1  0  0  1  0  1  1  0  1  1  0  0  1  0  0  1  0  0  1  0  0  1  0  0  0  0  0  1  0  0  1  0  0  1  0  0               
accepted  T  -  E  -  -  E  T  -  E  -  -  E  -  -  E  -  -  E  T  -  -  T  -  -  T  -  -  -  -  -  T  -  E  -  -  E  T  -  -  T  -  -  T  -  E               A way to look for an answer to the unexpected results obtained from the experiments is 
searching for individual error made by the participants. To make an individual error means to 
vote for a rule which is less efficient in terms of payoff than another one. The definition of 
efficient voting behaviour here used follows closely what just seen in the introductory section 
of this work. The cyclical voting pattern expected accordingly with the Condorcet paradox 
requires that the voters always vote for their first best alternative as well as for their second 
best  alternative  while  never  vote  for  the  third  best  one.  To  compute  an  index  which  is 
coherent  with  this  specific  definition  of  efficiency,  means  to  weight  in  the  same  way  a 
positive voting for the first and the second choice and a negative vote for the third choice. 
Tables 3.3, 3.3bis, 3.4 and 3.4bis show the percentages of efficient voting choices for each 
player of each group. More precisely, tables 3.3 and 3.4 report the efficiency percentage for 
each rule (respectively for experiment 1 and 2) while tables 3.3bis and 3.4bis account for the 
mean efficiency of voting. Looking to table 3.3 and 3.4 one can note that some players have a 
very low efficiency performance (the extreme case of wrong behaviour is given by player SE 
from group 1 of experiment 1 who had a zero efficiency score, i.e. s/he has always mistaken). 
In both the experiments none of the players achieved a total efficiency score. The player who 
got  the  highest  score  (83,33)  in  tab.3.3bis  was  SO  of  group  1  while  in  tab.  3.4bis  the 
maximum efficiency score (69,23) was obtained by player NE of group 3. 
From a general point of view the subjects of the experiment 1 have been more efficient 
than the participants of the experiments 2, but this is due to the fact that experiment 1 lasted 
less than experiment 2. Furthermore it is worth underlining that the definition of efficiency 
that we have used so far is referred to the one shot solution of the game. This means that a 
dynamical pattern like the one produced for example by group 2,3, and 4 of experiment 1 is 
equal to a perfectly efficient voting process, while a stable pattern like the one followed by 
group 2 of experiment 2 is, by definition, very near to a perfect inefficient voting process.  
After experiment 2 the participants were invited to answer to some questions regarding    14




Fig. 3.2 Vote series in exp2 
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Fig. 3.4 Vote series in exp2 
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Tab. 3.3 Efficiency of vote (exp1) 
 
Role  Group  Vote% T  Vote% I  Vote% E 
N  1  0,00  100,00  25,00 
NE  1  60,00  0,00  50,00 
SE  1  0,00  0,00  0,00 
SO  1  100,00  50,00  100,00 
NO  1  100,00  75,00  50,00 
N  2  100,00  100,00  0,00 
NE  2  80,00  0,00  75,00 
SE  2  80,00  0,00  100,00 
SO  2  80,00  75,00  25,00 
NO  2  100,00  100,00  25,00 
N  3  100,00  20,00  20,00 
NE  3  100,00  40,00  80,00 
SE  3  20,00  0,00  100,00 
SO  3  100,00  60,00  0,00 
NO  3  80,00  100,00  20,00 
N  4  80,00  60,00  0,00 
NE  4  80,00  20,00  100,00 
SE  4  80,00  0,00  100,00 
SO  4  100,00  80,00  0,00 
NO  4  100,00  100,00  0,00 
 
Tab. 3.3bis Mean efficiency of vote (exp1) 
Role  Group  Vote % 
N  1  41,67 
NE  1  36,67 
SE  1  0,00 
SO  1  83,33 
NO  1  75,00 
N  2  66,67 
NE  2  51,67 
SE  2  60,00 
SO  2  60,00 
NO  2  75,00 
N  3  46,67 
NE  3  73,33 
SE  3  40,00 
SO  3  53,33 
NO  3  66,67 
N  4  46,67 
NE  4  66,67 
SE  4  60,00 
SO  4  60,00 
NO  4  66,67 
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Tab. 3.4 Efficiency of vote and ranking of rule achieved by survey (exp2) 
 
Role  Group  Vote% T  Vote% I  Vote% E    Role  Group  Rank T  Rank I  Rank E 
N  1  66,67  88,89  0,00    N  1  3  1  2(+) 
NE  1  33,33  44,44  77,78    NE  1  3  2(-)  1 
SE  1  11,11  88,89  88,89    SE  1  3  2(+)  1 
SO  1  100,00  0,00  33,33    SO  1  1  3  2(-) 
NO  1  77,78  33,33  77,78    NO  1  1  3  2(=) 
N  2  77,78  52,94  5,88    N  2  3  1  2(+) 
NE  2  22,22  82,35  100,00    NE  2  3  2(-)  1 
SE  2  27,78  0,00  88,24    SE  2  3  2(+)  1 
SO  2  94,44  11,76  0,00    SO  2  1  2(=)  3 
NO  2  100,00  0,00  5,88    NO  2  1  2(+)  3 
N  3  69,23  53,85  38,46    N  3  3  1  1 
NE  3  53,85  69,23  84,62    NE  3  3  2(-)  1 
SE  3  53,85  0,00  69,23    SE  3  2(+)  3  1 
SO  3  84,62  7,69  61,54    SO  3  2(+)  3  1 
NO  3  46,15  38,46  15,38    NO  3  1  2(-)  3 
N  4  46,67  6,67  60,00    N  4  2(+)  3  1 
NE  4  20,00  6,67  100,00    NE  4  3  2(-)  1 
SE  4  6,67  73,33  93,33    SE  4  3  2(+)  1 
SO  4  100,00  13,33  13,33    SO  4  1  3  2(-) 
NO  4  93,33  6,67  20,00    NO  4  1  3  2(-) 
 
Tab. 3.4bis Mean efficiency of vote (exp2) 
Role  Group  Vote % 
N  1  51,85 
NE  1  51,85 
SE  1  62,96 
SO  1  44,44 
NO  1  62,96 
N  2  45,53 
NE  2  68,19 
SE  2  38,67 
SO  2  35,40 
NO  2  35,29 
N  3  53,85 
NE  3  69,23 
SE  3  41,03 
SO  3  51,28 
NO  3  33,33 
N  4  37,78 
NE  4  42,22 
SE  4  57,78 
SO  4  42,22 
NO  4  40,00   19
Fig. 3.5: NORTH player vote efficency (exp. 1) 
 


















Fig. 3.6: NORTH-EAST player vote efficency (exp. 1) 
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Fig. 3.7 SOUTH-EAST player vote efficency (exp. 1) 
 

















Fig. 3.8: SOUTH-WEST player vote efficency (exp. 1) 
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Fig. 3.9: NORTH-WEST player vote efficency (exp. 1) 
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Fig. 3.10: NORTH player vote efficency (exp. 2) 
 


















Fig. 3.11: NORTH-EAST player vote efficency (exp. 2) 
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Fig. 3.12: SOUTH-EAST player vote efficency (exp. 2) 
 


















Fig. 3.13: SOUTH-WEST player vote efficency (exp. 2) 
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Fig. 3.14: NORTH-WEST player vote efficency (exp. 2) 
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Tab. 3.5 Game behaviour and rationality (exp1) 
 
Group 1                   
ROUND  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9 
Rule 
Played  T  I  T  E  T  E  T  E  T 
NE  m  i  e  e  i  e  m  e  m 
SE  m  i  e  e  m  e  m  e  m 
SO  e  i  m  e  m  e  e  e  e 
NO  i  i  i  e  e  e  m  e  i 
N  m  i  e  e  m  e  e  e  e 
                   
Group 2                   
ROUND  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9 
Rule 
Played  T  E  T  E  T  E  T  E  T 
NE  i  e  e  e  e  e  e  e  e 
SE  e  e  m  e  e  e  i  e  m 
SO  e  e  i  e  m  e  e  e  e 
NO  m  e  i  e  i  e  m  e  i 
N  i  e  e  e  m  e  m  e  m 
                   
Group 3                   
ROUND  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9 
Rule 
Played  T  E  T  E  T  E  T  T  E 
NE  e  e  m  e  e  e  e  i  e 
SE  m  e  e  e  e  e  e  i  e 
SO  m  e  m  e  m  e  m  e  e 
NO  i  e  i  e  i  e  i  m  e 
N  e  e  m  e  m  e  i  e  e 
                   
Group 4                   
ROUND  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9 
Rule 
Played  T  E  E  T  E  T  E  T  E 
NE  e  e  e  i  e  e  e  e  e 
SE  e  e  e  e  e  e  e  e  e 
SO  m  e  e  e  e  i  e  m  e 
NO  i  e  e  m  e  e  e  i  e 
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Tab. 3.6 Game behaviour and rationality (exp2) 
 
Group 1                                     
ROUND  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18 
Rule 
Played  T  E  T  I  E  T  T  I  E  T  I  E  I  E  E  T  E  E 
NE  e  e  m  i  e  m  e  i  e  e  i  e  i  e  e  i  e  e 
SE  i  e  m  i  e  m  i  i  e  i  i  e  i  e  e  m  e  e 
SO  e  e  e  i  e  e  e  i  e  e  i  e  i  e  e  m  e  e 
NO  e  e  i  i  e  i  m  i  e  m  i  e  i  e  e  e  e  e 
N  e  e  e  i  e  e  e  i  e  e  i  e  i  e  e  e  e  e 
                                     
Group 2                                     
ROUND  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18 
Rule 
Played  T  I  T  T  T  T  T  E  T  T  T  T  T  T  T  T  T  T 
NE  e  i  m  e  e  e  m  e  e  e  i  e  i  e  e  m  e  e 
SE  e  i  e  e  e  m  e  e  e  e  i  m  i  m  e  m  i  i 
SO  e  i  e  m  m  e  e  e  m  m  e  e  e  e  m  e  e  e 
NO  m  i  i  i  i  i  i  e  i  i  m  i  m  i  i  i  m  m 
N  e  i  m  m  i  i  i  e  m  m  e  m  e  m  i  e  m  m 
                                     
Group 3                                     
ROUND  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18 
Rule 
Played  T  T  E  T  T  T  T  E  T  T  I  T  I  E  E  E  E  E 
NE  e  e  e  m  e  i  m  e  m  e  i  e  i  e  e  e  e  e 
SE  e  m  e  e  e  i  m  e  e  e  i  e  i  e  e  e  e  e 
SO  i  e  e  e  i  m  e  e  i  m  i  m  i  e  e  e  e  e 
NO  m  i  e  i  m  e  i  e  i  i  i  i  i  e  e  e  e  e 
N  i  m  e  m  m  e  e  e  e  m  i  m  i  e  e  e  e  e 
                                     
Group 4                                     
ROUND  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18 
Rule 
Played  T  E  E  T  E  E  E  E  T  T  T  T  E  E  T  T  T  E 
NE  m  e  e  e  e  e  e  e  e  i  i  e  e  e  m  i  e  e 
SE  m  e  e  e  e  e  e  e  e  i  i  m  e  e  m  i  m  e 
SO  e  e  e  m  e  e  e  e  m  e  e  m  e  e  e  e  m  e 
NO  i  e  e  i  e  e  e  e  i  m  m  m  e  e  i  m  i  e 
N  e  e  e  m  e  e  e  e  m  e  e  e  e  e  e  e  e  e 
   27
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